I.C. Golaknath v State of Punjab

*I.C. Golaknath v State of Punjab* (1967) was a landmark — and highly controversial — ruling in which the Supreme Court, by a narrow majority of 6:5, held that Parliament has no power to amend the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. It overruled the earlier decisions in *Shankari Prasad* (1951) and *Sajjan Singh* (1965) and declared that constitutional amendments, to the extent they abridge fundamental rights, are void. The ruling lasted only six years before being overruled by the thirteen-judge Bench in *Kesavananda Bharati* (1973), but it provoked a constitutional crisis and shaped the development of Indian constitutional law profoundly.

Background & Facts

The Golaknath family owned a large agricultural estate in Jalandhar, Punjab. The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 limited the amount of land one person could hold and required surplus land to be surrendered to the government. The Golaknaths held approximately 500 acres, far above the permissible ceiling. They challenged the land ceiling legislation on the ground that it violated their fundamental rights to acquire, hold, and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31.

Critically, the First and Seventeenth Constitutional Amendments had placed the impugned legislation in the Ninth Schedule, purportedly immunising it from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. The Golaknaths argued that these constitutional amendments themselves were unconstitutional as they infringed upon fundamental rights.

The eleven-judge Bench was constituted to reconsider the earlier decisions in *Shankari Prasad* and *Sajjan Singh*, both of which had upheld Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights.

Legal Issues

1. Does Parliament have the power under Article 368 to amend or abridge fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III?

2. Is a constitutional amendment "law" within the meaning of Article 13(2), which prevents the State from making any law that takes away or abridges fundamental rights?

3. Were *Shankari Prasad* (1951) and *Sajjan Singh* (1965) correctly decided?

Arguments

**Petitioner's Contentions:**

The Golaknaths argued that fundamental rights are natural, inalienable rights of citizens that were deliberately placed beyond the ordinary reach of Parliament. The word "amendment" in Article 368 should not be read to authorise the destruction of the very freedoms the Constitution was meant to protect. Article 13(2) is an absolute prohibition: "the State shall not make any law" — and Parliament making a constitutional amendment is the State making law. Therefore, any constitutional amendment abridging fundamental rights is void.

**Respondent's Contentions:**

The State and Union argued that the previous Constitution Bench decisions in *Shankari Prasad* and *Sajjan Singh* had settled this question. Parliament exercising its constituent power under Article 368 is not "the State making law" within the meaning of Article 13(2). The constituent power is qualitatively different from ordinary legislative power. The framers had intended Parliament to be able to adapt the Constitution to meet the needs of a developing society, including adjusting the scope of fundamental rights when necessary for socio-economic transformation.

Judgment & Reasoning

Chief Justice K. Subba Rao, writing for the 6:5 majority, held:

**1. Fundamental Rights Are Transcendental and Inviolable:** Fundamental rights are not mere gifts of Parliament — they are inalienable, inherent rights of citizens. The Constitution was framed to protect them. Parliament, as a creature of the Constitution, cannot use the amending procedure to destroy the rights the Constitution was designed to safeguard.

**2. "Law" in Article 13 Includes Constitutional Amendments:** Overruling *Shankari Prasad*, the majority held that a constitutional amendment is "law" within the meaning of Article 13(2). The word "law" is used in a wide sense in Article 13; it should be interpreted to include every exercise of state power that affects legal rights, including the exercise of constituent power. Therefore, any amendment that abridges fundamental rights is void.

**3. Constituent Power is Part of Legislative Power:** The majority rejected the argument that constituent power is entirely separate from ordinary legislative power. The same Parliament that enacts ordinary laws also enacts constitutional amendments, albeit under a different and more rigorous procedure. The procedural distinction does not change the character of the power.

**4. Doctrine of Prospective Overruling:** To avoid the chaos that would result from invalidating all previous constitutional amendments with immediate effect, Chief Justice Subba Rao innovated by applying the doctrine of **prospective overruling** — borrowed from American constitutional law. The ruling would apply only to future constitutional amendments; the First, Fourth, Seventeenth, and other previous amendments would remain valid and could not be challenged on this ground.

Significance

**Triggering the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments:** Parliament responded to *Golaknath* by enacting the 24th Constitutional Amendment, which expressly inserted a provision clarifying that Article 368 confers power on Parliament to amend any provision of the Constitution, and that "law" in Article 13 does not include a constitutional amendment. The 25th and 29th Amendments further expanded the Ninth Schedule and restricted judicial review of property acquisition. These amendments were ultimately challenged in and substantially decided by *Kesavananda Bharati* (1973).

**Introduction of Prospective Overruling in India:** This was the first time the doctrine of prospective overruling was applied in India. The doctrine allows a court to change the law while limiting the retroactive impact of its new rule, providing a pragmatic tool for judicial legislation.

**Overruled by Kesavananda Bharati:** The majority holding in *Golaknath* — that Parliament cannot amend fundamental rights at all — was overruled in *Kesavananda Bharati* (1973). That case held that Parliament does have power to amend fundamental rights, but cannot do so in a manner that destroys the basic structure of the Constitution. The *Kesavananda* framework is a compromise between the *Shankari Prasad* view (unlimited power) and the *Golaknath* view (no power), settling on a middle position (limited power, constrained by basic structure).

Key Takeaways

- By a 6:5 majority, the Court held that Parliament has **no power to amend fundamental rights** — this was later overruled by *Kesavananda Bharati* (1973).

- The majority held that "law" in Article 13(2) includes constitutional amendments, making any amendment abridging fundamental rights void.

- The doctrine of **prospective overruling** was introduced in Indian constitutional law to limit the retroactive effect of the decision.

- The ruling provoked Parliament to enact the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments to reassert its amending power.

- The eventual settlement — in *Kesavananda Bharati* — is that Parliament may amend fundamental rights but not destroy the Constitution's basic structure.

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*This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal matters, please consult a qualified advocate.*